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ABSTRACT
A major branch of anomaly detection methods relies on dynamic
networks: raw sequence data is first converted to a series of net-
works, then critical change points are identified in the evolving
network structure. However, existing approaches use first-order net-
works (FONs) to represent the underlying raw data, which may lose
important higher-order sequence patterns, making higher-order
anomalies undetectable in subsequent analysis. We present a novel
higher-order anomaly detection method that is both parameter-
free and scalable, building on an improved higher-order network
(HON) construction algorithm. We show the proposed higher-order
anomaly detection algorithm is effective in discovering variable
orders of anomalies. Our data includes a synthetic 11 billion web
clickstreams and a real-world taxi trajectory data.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Information systems→ Data mining; Social networks; • The-
ory of computation→Graph algorithms analysis; •Comput-
ing methodologies→ Anomaly detection;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Anomalies are deviation from the norm or expected behavior of a
complex system. Timely and accurate detection of such anomalies
is critical as they may affect the behavior or outcome of such a
complex system. Moreover, the anomalies can manifest themselves
as a point in time or an emerging phenomenon, presenting its
own suite of challenges. The problems are more pronounced when
the complex system is represented a network, given the inherent
dependencies and relationships among the components (nodes) of
the system. While there exists a wide range of anomaly detection
methods on dynamic networks [2, 16], all of them use the first-
order network (FON) to represent the underlying raw data (such as
clickstreams or event sequences), which can lose important higher-
order information inherent in the raw data [18, 25]. As FON is an
oversimplification of higher-order dynamics, anomaly detection
algorithms that rely on FONs will miss important changes in the
network, thus leaving anomalies in complex systems undetected.
Example. Fig. 1 illustrates the challenge of detecting certain
types of anomalies, using a minimal example of web clickstreams
data (sequences of web page views produced by users) collected by
Web clickstream 1:
Web clickstream 2:
Web clickstream 3:
Web clickstream 4:
8:00 - 9:00
First-order network 
(FON)
Higher-order network
(HON)
9:00 - 10:00
Figure 1: Higher-order anomalies cannot be detected by
network-based anomaly detection methods if FON is used.
a local media company λ. Given the web clickstreams as the input to
network-based anomaly detection methods, conventionally, a web
traffic network is built for each time window (two one-hour win-
dows illustrated here), with the nodes representing web pages and
the edges representing total traffic between web pages. Company λ
monitors this dynamic web traffic network; a change in the network
topology indicates an anomaly in web traffic patterns. According to
the original clickstreams, in the first hour, all users coming from the
soccer web page to the weather page proceed to the ticket page, and
all users coming from the skating page to the weather page go to
TV schedules. But the flow of users is completely flipped in the next
hour, possibly the weather forecast has updated with a much colder
weather which is in favor of winter activities. However, despite
the significant changes in user web viewing patterns, the pairwise
traffic between web pages in this example remains the same, thus
the FON topology shows no changes. Therefore, no matter what
network-based anomaly detection method is used, if the method
relies on FON, Company λ will not be able to detect such type of
anomalies, thus failing to respond (e.g., caching pages for visits /
targeted promotion of pages) to the changes in user behaviors.
Contributions. We systematically demonstrate why existing
network-based anomaly detection methods can leave certain sig-
nals undetected, and propose to integrate HON into the anomaly
detection pipeline. To achieve this objective, we also address the
limitations of our prior work [25] on HON construction, namely,
the dependency on multiple parameters and scalability for higher-
orders. The parameter dependency can be especially limiting for
anomaly detection, given the varying nature of anomalies across
different complex systems. We resolve these issues with a novel
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parameter-free and scalable algorithm BuildHON+. We also show
that BuildHON+ can be plugged in existing anomaly detection ap-
proaches on large data with only a small overhead.
Using a large-scale synthetic clickstream data with 11 billion
clicks, we show how multiple existing anomaly detection meth-
ods that depend on FON collectively fail to capture anomalous
navigation behaviors beyond first order, and how BuildHON+ can
solve the problem. We also demonstrate BuildHON+ on a real-world
taxi trajectory data, showing its ability in amplifying higher-order
anomaly signals and revealing the anomalous locations. Finally,
we provide complexity analysis of BuildHON+, as well as perfor-
mance analysis (running time and memory consumption) on the
global ship movement data which is known to exhibit dependencies
beyond fifth order. All code and data are made available online.1
2 RELATEDWORK
Terminology. In literature, the term “anomaly detection” appears
interchangeably with “change point detection” and “event detec-
tion". All three terms represent a state that deviates from the “norm”,
among which “anomaly” more frequently refers to a state that
changes back to the norm soon, whereas a “change point” may not
change back. In this paper, we refer to the more general “change
point detection”, whereas anomalies that change back to the norm
can be seen as two consecutive change points and can be detected
along with change points.
Anomaly detection in sequential data. There are two di-
rections of sequential data anomaly detection tasks. Suppose the
input data has clickstreams of multiple users, one direction is to
identify users with clickstreams significantly different than others
(e.g., capturing hacking behaviors); this direction has been studied
with sequence similarities [4, 21], sliding windows [24], Markovian
methods [11, 17, 22], HMM methods [10], and so on. The other
direction is to identify the time window when most users suddenly
change their browsing patterns (revealing breaking news, crowd
behavior changes, etc.). It is also known as “event detection”, which
has been studied with sliding windows [5–7] and dynamic networks
[2]. A comprehensive review is in [3]. This paper focuses on the
identification of anomalous time windows rather than individual
trajectories, thus relates closer with the second category.
Anomaly detection in dynamic networks. Unlike the task
of detecting anomalous nodes and edges in a single static network
(such as [1]), anomaly detection in dynamic networks [2, 3] uses
multiple snapshots of networks to represent the interactions of
interest (such as interacting molecules [15], elements in frames
of videos [19], flow of invasive species [26], etc.), then identifies
the time when the network topology shows significant changes,
using network distance metrics [8, 14, 20], probability methods [13],
subgraph methods like [12] and more. Nevertheless, all existing
methods rely on the conventional FON; as we will show, certain
types of anomalies cannot be detected with any network-based
anomaly detection methods if FON is used. Rather than proposing
another approach to identify the anomalous network from a series
of networks, our innovation lies in the network construction step,
which ensures anomalous signals are preserved in the network in
the first place.
1https://github.com/xyjprc/hon
3 METHODS
Our previously developed algorithm, BuildHON cannot be adapted
directly to network-based anomaly detection due to (1) parameter-
dependent results and (2) scalability constraints. BuildHON requires
two parameters which had to be specified experimentally, depend-
ing on the data set. Furthermore, it uses an exhaustive search for
extracting dependency rules and network construction, which be-
comes impractical for anomaly detection. We overcome these limi-
tations through a higher order anomaly detection framework, in-
cluding improved HON construction algorithm, BuildHON+, which
makes it practical to use HON for anomaly detection tasks.
3.1 Higher-order Anomaly Detection
In this subsection, we review the network-based anomaly detection
framework, and demonstrate why HON should be used.
Definition. The procedure of a network-based anomaly detec-
tion method takes the sequential data, S = [S1, S2, . . . , ST ] which
is divided into T time windows t ∈ [1,T ] as the input. In each
time window, the sequential data is represented as a network, i.e.,
Si → Gi , yielding a dynamic network G = [G1,G2, . . . ,GT ] com-
posed of the sequence of networks. The dynamic network G is then
used to find the change point(s) t ∈ [1,T ] when Gt is significantly
different from Gt−1. The difference between networks in neigh-
boring time intervals, i.e., dt = D(Gt−1,Gt ), can be quantified by
network distance metrics D (e.g., [8, 14, 20]). Then the problem of
anomaly detection on networks reduces to anomaly detection in
the time series of [d2,d3, . . . ,dT ]. Next, to determine if the network
difference dt is significantly high, straightforwardly, if dt is larger
than a fixed threshold ∆, Gt is anomalously different than Gt−1.
Another more robust way is to establish the norm of network differ-
ences by computing the running average and standard deviation of
network differences in the last k time intervals, the null hypothesis
being dt not significantly large; if dt deviates from the running
average by one or more standard deviations, the null hypothesis is
rejected and time t is considered a change point.
Existing network-based anomaly detectionmethodsmostly differ
at the network distance calculation step. However, for the Si → Gi
step, i.e., where raw sequential data is represented as networks,
existing methods all use the first-order network (FON) asG to repre-
sent the underlying sequential data S , by counting the occurrences
of pairs (bigrams) as edge weights in the network. Here for the
first time, we propose to use the higher-order network (HON) that
selectively embeds n-grams for the Si → Gi step. HON keeps all
structures of FON, and when higher-order dependencies exist in the
raw sequential data, it splits a node into multiple nodes represent-
ing previous steps [25]. We show that certain types of anomalies
will remain undetected for all existing network-based anomaly
detection methods using FON, but can be revealed by using HON.
Example. Fig. 2 illustrates a side-by-side comparison of FON
and HON in the network representation step. Suppose there are
four user sessions in the web clickstream data. In time window I,
users at web page c randomly navigate to d or e , regardless if the
users came to page c from a or b. In this time window, HON is
identical to FON and there are no higher-order dependencies. In
time window II, the clickstreams are randomly shuffled, and the
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Figure 2: Comparing anomaly detection based on the first-order dynamic network and the higher-order dynamic network.
pairwise traffic between pages a,b, c,d, e remains the same as time
window I. Neither FON nor HON shows changes.
In time window III, second-order patterns emerge: all users that
had navigated from a to c go to d , and all users from b to c go to
e . Since the aggregated traffic from c to d and e remains the same,
the FON remains exactly the same, missing this newly emerged
pattern. In contrast, HON uses additional higher-order nodes and
edges to capture higher-order dependencies: node c is now splitted
into a new node c |a (representing c given the last step being a)
and node c |b (representing c given the last step being b). The path
a → c → d now becomes a → c |a → d ; the edge c → e rewired
similarly. Therefore, the emergence of the second-order pattern in
the raw data is reflected by the non-trivial changes in the topology
of HON. If we use the weight distance [20] defined as
D(G,H ) = |EG ∪ EH |−1
∑
u,v ∈V
|wGE (u,v) −wHE (u,v)|
max{wGE (u,v),wHE (u,v)}
(1)
with w being the edge weights and |E | being the total number of
edges, due to the complete changes in four out of the nine edges
on HON, the network distance D(G2,G3) = 0.44 > 0, successfully
captures this higher-order anomaly (a significant change in higher-
order navigation patterns).
In time window IV, the second-order browsing pattern changes:
all users that navigated from web page a to c now visit page e
instead of d , and all from b to c now visit d instead of e . Since the
pairwise clickstream traffic from c tod and e remains the same, FON
remains the same. However, HON captures the changes with two
edge rewirings: now c |a → e and c |b → d , resulting inD(G3,G4) =
0.22 > 0.
In brief, FON is an oversimplification of sequential data produced
by complex systems, and conventional network-based anomaly
detection methods that use FON may fail to capture the emergence
and changes of higher-order navigation patterns. If HON is used
instead, without changes to distance metrics, existing methods can
capture these previously ignored anomalies.
3.2 BuildHON+: Building HON from Big Data
Anomaly detection algorithms should have only one parameter: the
detection threshold. Unfortunately, as is, the existing HON construc-
tion algorithm BuildHON [25] is not suited for anomaly detection.
It needs two parameters in addition to the detection threshold: a
MaxOrder parameter which governs how many orders of depen-
dencies the algorithm will consider in HON, and a MinSupport
parameter that discards infrequent observations. As a result, anom-
aly detection using BuildHON is susceptible to parameters irrelevant
to the detection threshold. BuildHON also does not scale to large
networks, precisely when anomaly detection is most needed due to
the complexity of the data and the inability to properly visualize it.
Here we introduce BuildHON+, a parameter-free algorithm that
constructs HON from big data sets. BuildHON+ is the first practi-
cal approach that preserves higher-order signals in the network
representation step (Si → Gi ) which is essential for anomaly de-
tection. Using BuildHON+, our anomaly detection has only one pa-
rameter: the detection threshold. The difference between BuildHON
and BuildHON+ is similar to the difference between pruning and
early stopping in decision trees. BuildHON first builds an HON of
all orders from first order to MaxOrder and then selects branches
showing significant higher-order dependencies. BuildHON+ reduces
the search space beforehand by checking in each step if increasing
the order may produce significant dependencies.
3.2.1 BuildHON. The core of BuildHON is the dependency rule
extraction step, which answers whether higher-order dependen-
cies exist in the raw sequential data, and how high the orders are.
The dependency rules extracted are then converted to higher-order
nodes and edges as the building blocks of HON. Rather than deriv-
ing a fixed order of dependency for the whole network, the method
allows for variable orders of dependencies for more compact rep-
resentation. Fig. 3 illustrates the dependency rule extraction step.
BuildHON first counts the observed n-grams in the raw data (step
1○), then compute probability distributions for the next steps given
the current and previous steps (step 2○). Finally test if knowing one
more previous step significantly changes the distribution for the
next step – if so, higher-order dependency exists for the path (step
4○); this procedure (“rule growing”) is iterated recursively until a
pre-definedMaxOrder (shown hereMaxOrder = 3). In this example,
the probability distribution of the next steps fromC changes signifi-
cantly if the previous step (coming toC fromA or B) is known (step
4○), but knowing more previous steps (coming to C from E → A
3
or D → B) does not make a difference (step 5○); therefore, paths
C |A→ D and C |A→ E demonstrate second-order dependencies.
Formally, the “rule growing” process works as follows: for each
path (n-gram) S = [St−k , St−(k−1), . . . , St ] of order k , starting from
the first order k = 1, assume k is the true order of dependency,
which S has the distribution D for the next step. Then extend S
to Sext = [St−(k+1), St−k , St−(k−1), . . . , St ] by adding one more
previous step; Sext has order kext = k + 1 and distribution Dext .
Next, test if Dext is significantly different than that of D using
Kullback-Leibler divergence [9] as DKL(Dext | |D), and compare
with a dynamic threshold δ – if the divergence is larger than δ ,
order k + 1 is assumed instead of k for the path Sext . The dy-
namic threshold δ is defined as δ = kextlog2(1+Suppor tSext ) , so that
lower orders are preferred than higher orders, unless higher order
paths have sufficient support (number of observations). The whole
process is iterated recursively untilMaxOrder .
3.2.2 Eliminating all parameters. The reason for having theMax-
Order and MinSupport parameters in BuildHON is to set a hard stop
for the rule growing process, otherwise it will iterate indefinitely
and keep extending S. Here we show how we can pre-determine if
extending S will not produce significantly different distributions.
Lemma 3.1. The significance threshold δ = kextlog2(1+Suppor tSext )
increases monotonically in rule growing when expanding S to Sext .
Proof. On the numerator, the order kext of the extended se-
quence Sext increases monotonically with the inclusion of more
previous steps. Meanwhile, every observations of
[St−(k+1), St−k , . . . , St−1, St ] in the raw data can find a correspond-
ing observation of [St−k , . . . , St−1, St ], but not the otherway around.
Therefore, the support of Sext , SupportSext ≤ SupportS of the lower
order k = kext − 1. As a result, the denominator decreases mono-
tonically with the rule growing process. □
Given the next step distribution D = [P1, P2, . . . , PN ] of se-
quence S, we can derive an upper-bound of possible divergence:
max(DKL(Dext | |D))
=max(
∑
i ∈D
Pext (i) × loд2 Pext (i)
P(i) )
≤ 1 × loд2 1
min(P(i)) + 0 + 0 + . . .
= −loд2(min(P(i)))
(2)
The equal sign (maximum possible divergence) is taken iff the
least likely option for the next step P(i) in S becomes the most
likely option Pext (i) = 1 in Sext , and all other options have P = 0.
Therefore, we can test if−loд2(min(PDistr (i))) < δ holds during the
rule growing process; if it holds, then further increasing the order
(adding more previous steps) will not produce significantly different
distributions, so we can stop the rule growing process and take the
last known k as the true order of dependency. An advantage of this
proposed parameter-free approach is that rather than terminating
the rule growing process prematurely by theMaxOrder threshold,
the algorithm can now extract arbitrarily high order of dependency.
3.2.3 Scalability for Higher-orders. BuildHON builds all observa-
tions and distributions up toMaxOrder ahead of the rule growing
process (Fig. 3 left). This procedure becomes prohibitively expensive
for big data and data with high orders of dependencies: to extract
sparse tenth order dependencies, BuildHON needs to enumerate
n-grams from first order to tenth order and compare probability
distributions, which already exceeds a personal computer’s capacity
using a typical real-world data set (see Section 4.3).
Our contribution, BuildHON+, uses lazy construction of observa-
tions and distributions which has a much smaller search space, and
can easily scale to arbitrarily high order of dependency. Specifically,
we do not count the occurrences of n-grams, nor calculate the dis-
tribution of the next steps, until the rule growing step explicitly
asks for such information.
Example. BuildHON+ first builds all first-order observations
and distributions (Fig. 3 right step 1○– 3○). Given that A → C ,
B → C , D → B, E → A all have single deterministic options for
the next step with P = 1, according to −loд2(min(PDistr (i))) = 0 <
δ , BuildHON+ knows no higher-order dependencies can possibly
exist by extending these bigrams (step 4○). Only the two paths
C → D and C → E will be extended; since the corresponding
second-order observations and distributions are not known yet,
BuildHON+selectively derives the necessary information from the
raw data (Fig. 3 right step 5○– 7○), and finds that the second-order
distributions show significant changes. At this point, bothC |A→ D
andC |B → E have single deterministic options for the next step, so
again, BuildHON+ determines no dependencies beyond second order
can exist (step 8○), so the rule growing procedure stops, without
the need for further generation and comparison of distributions.
The challenge is how to count the n-gram of interest on demand
– seemingly every on-demand construction requires a traversal of
the raw sequential data with complexity of Θ(L). However, given
the following knowledge:
Lemma 3.2. All observations of the sequence [St−k−1, St−k , . . . ,
St−1, St ] can be found exactly at the current and one preceding loca-
tions of all observations of sequence [St−k , . . . , St−1, St ] in the raw
data.
Instead of traversing the raw data, we use an indexing cache to
store the locations of known observations, then use that to narrow
down higher-order n-gram look-ups. As illustrated in Fig. 3, if we
cache the locations ofC → D andC → E in the raw sequential data,
then C |A→ D and C |B → E can be found at the same locations.
During the rule growing process, if Sext has not been observed,
recursively check if the lower-order observation is in the indexing
cache, and use those cached indexes to perform fast lookup in
the raw data. New observations from Sext are then added to the
indexing cache. This procedure guarantees the identification of
observations of the previously unseenSext , and the lookup time for
each observation is Θ(1) when the indexing cache is implemented
with hash tables.
Complexity analysis. We formally analyze the computational
complexity of BuildHON. Suppose the size of raw sequential data
is L, all first order observations (bigrams) take Θ(2L) space, second
order observations (trigrams) take Θ(3L) space, and so on; build-
ing observations and distributions up to kth order takes Θ(2L +
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Figure 3: Comparison of the active observation construction in BuildHON (left) and the lazy observation construction in
BuildHON+ (right, with a much smaller search space). Circled numbers represent the order of execution.
3L + 4L + · · · + (k + 1)L) = Θ(k2L) storage. Suppose N is the num-
ber of unique entities in the raw data, the time complexity of the
algorithm is Θ(Nk2L): all observations will be traversed at least
once; testing if adding a previous step significantly changes the
probability distribution of the next step takes up to Θ(N ) time (if
Kullback-Leibler divergence [9] is used).
On BuildHON+, space complexity isΘ(2R1+3R2+ . . . ) (including
observations, distributions, and the indexing cache), where Rk is
the actual number of higher-order dependency rules for order k .
Since Rk ≤ L, and in practice, when k >> 2, Rk << L (higher-order
rules are usually sparse), the overall space complexity of BuildHON+
is significantly smaller than that of BuildHON (which is Θ(k2L)).
The same applies to time complexity: while BuildHON hasΘ(Nk2L),
BuildHON+ has Θ(N (2R1 + 3R2 + . . . )). A side-by-side comparison
between BuildHON and BuildHON+ in running time and memory
consumption on a real-world data set is provided in Section 4.3.
4 RESULTS
In this section, we first construct a large-scale synthetic clickstream
data with 11 billion movements and variable orders of dependencies,
and show that five existing anomaly detection methods based on
FON collectively fail to capture anomalous navigation behaviors
beyond first order, while using our framework, all methods show
significant improvements. We also demonstrate HON on a real-
world taxi trajectory data, showing its ability in amplifying higher-
order anomaly signals and revealing the exact location of anomalies.
Note that we use the proposed BuildHON+ algorithm to construct
HON for all following experiments, except for the last step where
we compare with BuildHON in terms of running time and memory
consumption on real-world data.
4.1 Large-scale Synthetic Web Clickstreams
We first use the synthetic web clickstream data test the effectiveness
of the HON-based anomaly detection framework. With synthetic
data, we know exactly when, where, and what types of anomalies
exist. To begin with, we assume there are 100,000 users navigating
through 100 web pages which are organized as a 10x10 grid (for
convenient illustration) and numbered from 00 to 99. Every page
has two out-links to the neighboring pages, one pointing right and
one pointing down, with wrapping (a rightmost page can point to
the leftmost page in the same row, and a bottom page can point
to the top page in the same column). At each time stamp, every
user clicks through 100 pages by moving right or moving down,
resulting in 10,000,000 records per time stamp.
Our goal is to synthesize input sequences with variable orders
of user navigating patterns. We start from the basic case where
all user navigate randomly, then gradually add or change first-
order and higher-order navigation rules, and see if the proposed
method can successfully identify these anomalies. For each of the
following 11 cases, we maintain the user navigation behavior for
100 time windows. In total, we generate 11,000,000,000 clicks for the
subsequent anomaly detection task. The full process to synthesize
the input trajectories is illustrated in Fig. 4.
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Figure 4: Synthetic web clickstream data: variable orders of user browsing patterns on 100 web pages as a 10x10 grid.
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Figure 5: Methods that use FON collectively fail to capture
anomalous navigation behaviors beyond first order no mat-
ter what distance metric is used, but all show signals when
HON is used instead.
Initial random movement case. At t = [0, 99], each user has
50% chance of navigating to the page on the right and 50% chance
of navigating down in each click.
Emergence of first-order dependency. At t = [100, 199], we
impose the following first-order rule of movement: all users landing
on page 00, 03 and 06 will have 90% chance of navigating to the
page on the right in the next step, and 10% chance of moving down.
This new rule incurs a significant change of first-order clickstream
traffic at t = 100 between pages 00–01, 00–10, 03–04, 03–13, 06–07
and 06–16. The locations of these dependency rules are highlighted
on the right of Fig. 4.
Change of first-order dependency. At t = [200, 299], we
change the existing first-order movement rules: all users coming to
page 00, 03 and 06 will now have 90% chance of moving down in
the next step, and 10% chance of moving right. Pairwise clickstream
traffic changes again at t = 200.
Emergence of second-order dependency. At t = [300, 399],
we keep the previous first-order rules, and impose a new second-
order rule: all users coming from page 27 to 28 will have 90% chance
of moving to the right in the next step, and 10% chance of moving
down. This change at t = 300 not only introduces new higher-order
dependencies, but also slightly influences first-order traffic (traffic
of 27→ 28→ 29/38 changes from 1:1 to 7:3).
Emergence of complementary second-order dependencies.
At t = [400, 499], we impose a pair of new second-order rules: (1) all
users coming from page 30 to 31 (and 34 to 35) will have 90% chance
of moving to the right in the next step, and 10% chance of moving
down; (2) all users coming from page 21 to 31 (and 25 to 35) will
have 90% chance of moving down, and 10% chance of moving right.
The combined effect of these two new complementary second-order
dependencies at t = 400 is that the first-order clickstream traffic
from page 31 and 35 remains unchanged.
Change of complementary second-order dependencies. At
t = [500, 599], we flip the rules for the complementary second-order
dependencies: (1) all users coming from page 30 to 31 (and 34 to 35)
will have 90% chance of moving down, and 10% chance of moving
right; (2) all users coming from page 21 to 31 (and 25 to 35) will
have 90% chance of moving right, and 10% chance of moving down.
At t = 500 the first-order clickstream traffic from cell 31 and 35 still
remains unchanged.
Emergence of third-order dependency. At t = [600, 699],
we impose a new third-order rule: all users coming from cell 61
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through 71 to 81 will have 90% chance of moving to the right in
the next step, and 10% chance of moving down. This introduction
of third-order dependency at t = 600 also slightly influences the
first-order traffic (from 1:1 to 3:2).
Emergence of complementary third-order dependencies.
At t = [700, 799], we impose a pair of new third-order rules: (1)
all users coming from page 64 through 74 to 84 (and 67 through
77 to 87) will have 90% chance of moving to the right in the next
step, and 10% chance of moving down; (2) all users coming from 73
through 74 to 84 (and 76 through 77 to 87) will have 90% chance
of moving down, and 10% chance of moving right. Here at t = 700
first-order traffic does not change when these two complementary
third-order dependencies are introduced together.
Change of complementary third-order dependencies. At
t = [800, 899], we flip the rules for the complementary third-order
dependencies. First-order traffic at t = 800 again remains un-
changed.
Emergence of complementary mixed-order dependency.
At t = [900, 999], we impose a new third-order rule and a first-
order rule: (1) all users coming from page 39 through 49 to 59 will
have 90% chance of moving to the right in the next step, and 10%
chance of moving down; (2) all users at cell 59 will have 11/30
chance of moving right and 19/30 chance of moving down. At
t = 900 first-order traffic does not change, because the influence of
the new third-order rule on pairwise traffic is canceled by the new
first-order rule.
Change of complementary mixed-order dependency. At
t = [1000, 1099], we flip the rules for the mixed-order dependencies.
First-order traffic at t = 1000 remains unchanged.
4.1.1 Distance Metrics. As for the network distance metric D,
we evaluate five graph distance measures here, the first one being
the weight distance introduced earlier (Equation 1).
The second ismaximum common subgraph (MCS) distance,
defined similar to the weight distance in Equation 1 but operates
on the maximum common subgraph [20]:
D(G,H ) = |EG ∩ EH |−1
∑
u,v ∈V
|wGE (u,v) −wHE (u,v)|
max{wGE (u,v),wHE (u,v)}
(3)
The third ismodality [8]:
D(G,H ) = | |π (G) − π (H )| | (4)
where π (G) and π (H ) are the Perron vectors of graphs G and H ,
respectively.
Fourth is the entropy graph distance [14]:
D(G,H ) = E(G) − E(H ) (5)
where E(∗) is the entropy measure of the edges:
E(∗) =
∑
e ∈E∗
W˜ e∗ −
∑
e ∈E∗
ln W˜ e∗ (6)
and:
W˜ e∗ =
W e∗∑
e ∈E∗
W e∗
(7)
is the normalized weight for edge e.
Fifth is the spectral distance [14]:
D(G,H ) =
√√√√√√ k∑i=1(λi − µi )2
min(
k∑
i=1
λ2i ,
k∑
i=1
µ2i )
(8)
where λi and µi represent the eigenvalues of the Laplacianmatrix
for graph G and G, respectively.
4.1.2 Anomaly Detection Results. For all five distance metrics,
we present a side-by-side comparison between anomaly detection
results using FON andHON in Fig. 5. The Y-axis shows the graph dis-
tances between neighboring time windows; given that we have in-
jected 10 anomalous movement patterns at t = [100, 200, . . . , 1000],
we should expect to see 10 “spikes” in graph distances.
Methods using FON can detect at most 4 out of the 10 anomalies:
the addition and changes in first-order movement patterns (t =
100, t = 200), the addition of second-order (t = 300), and the
addition of third-order (t = 600) movement patterns. Because the
latter two cases also slightly change the first-order traffic, FON does
reflects the changes, but the spikes incurred are not as significant
as when changes are made directly to first-order rules. For the
other six cases, all five distance metrics appear as if there are no
anomalies, as long as they rely on FON topology.
In contrast, methods using HON (1) capture all first-order anom-
alies (t = 100, t = 200); (2) show stronger signals for the addition of
second-order and third-order rules (t = 300, t = 600) because not
only the first-order traffic is changed but BuildHON+ also creates
additional higher-order nodes and edges for higher-order depen-
dencies; (3) capture the six additional cases where higher-order
movement patterns are changed but first-order clickstream traf-
fic remain the same. Here the topological changes of HON are
best reflected with weight distance and spectrum distance (detect-
ing 10/10 anomalies); MCS weight method misses the addition of
higher-order nodes and edges (t = 400, 700, 900) because those
topological changes are excluded from common subgraphs; entropy
method misses changes in edge weights (t = 200, 500, 800, 1000),
also because by definition a swap in edge weights does not change
a graph’s entropy. Nevertheless, all these distance metrics are able
to identify more types of anomalous signals simply by using HON
instead of FON, with no changes to these distance metrics. In other
words, BuildHON+ can be plugged in to existing graph-based anom-
aly detection methods directly, and extend their ability in detecting
higher-order anomalies.
4.2 Real-world Porto Taxi Data
We use the ECML/PKDD 2015 challenge data2, which contains one
year (Jul. 1, 2013 to Jun. 30, 2014) of all the 442 taxi GPS trajectories
in Porto, Portugal. The coordinates of each taxi was collected at
every 15 seconds. To discretize the geolocation data into points of
interests that are representative of population density, we map all
coordinates to the nearest 41 police stations (Fig. 7(a)). We take
every week as a single time window, yielding 52 time windows,
each containing 442 trajectories of points of interest. In each week,
the trajectories (after removing repetitive points of interest) are
used to construct the FON and HON traffic networks of the week.
2http://www.geolink.pt/ecmlpkdd2015-challenge/dataset.html
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Figure 6: (a) Anomaly detection results on the dynamic network of FON and HON. (b) and (c) HON amplifies the anomalous
traffic patterns.
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Figure 7: (a) Labeling of police stations in urban areas of Porto. (b) and (c) the emergence of higher-order traffic patterns in
Week 44 (“Burning of the Ribbons” festival) captured by HON, corresponding to the highlighted region in (a).
4.2.1 Observations with FON and HON. Given the 52 networks
for both FON and HON, we compute the graph distances (using
weight distance) for neighboring time windows, as in Fig. 6(a). We
also compute the running average and standard deviation using
the graph distances in previous 10 weeks, with the null hypothesis
as “the network is not significantly different if the graph distance
does not deviate more than 2σ from the mean”. While the trend
of HON resembles that of FON, the graph distances in Week 44
are particularly more significant in HON than that in FON. Such
differences are also indicated in the histograms of graph distances
in Fig. 6(b) and (c), where the orange circles highlight the same
anomalous signals, which is more significant on HON than on FON.
We focus on the case of Week 44 to understand why HON pro-
duces stronger signal than FON in this time window. We notice
that Porto’s second most important festival, “Burning of the Rib-
bons”, lasts from May 4 to May 11 in 2014 and falls within Week
44 of our study. The festival involves parades, road closures, and is
popular among tourists, which could be the underlying reason to
the changes in taxis’ movement patterns. After plotting the traffic
HON of Week 43 and Week 44 in Fig. 7, we notice that multiple
higher-order nodes and edges emerge in Week 44, indicating the
emergence of higher-order traffic patterns. The newly emerged
higher-order patterns correspond to police stations labeled from 9
to 14, which is where the event’s main venue (QueimÃşdromo in
the City Park) and participating universities are located.3 Due to the
3http://www.maiahoje.pt/noticias/ler-noticia.php?noticia=577
changes in additional nodes and edges in HON compared to FON
(which only captures the aggregated first-order traffic changes), the
anomalous signals are amplified on HON.
Figure 8: Given the same data [25], BuildHON+ extracts up to
11th order in 1/3 run-time and 1/5 memory of BuildHON.
4.3 Performance improvement of BuildHON+
To highlight the scalability advantage of BuildHON+, instead of the
taxi data or the synthetic data (which demonstrates up to third
order of dependency), we use the same shipping trajectories data
as used in the HON paper [25]. This data was shown to demon-
strate dependencies of more than the fifth order due to ships’ cyclic
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movement patterns. It consists of 3,415,577 voyages made by 65,591
ships between May 1st , 2012 and April 30th , 2013.
For fair comparison, we use the Python implementation for
both BuildHON+ and BuildHON. Both implementations run single-
threaded on the same laptop (Intel i7-6600U@ 2.60GHz, 16GB RAM,
SSD). BuildHON+ is parameter-free (no limit to the maximum order,
optionalMinSupport = 1) and does not require further configuration.
We set MinSupport = 1 for BuildHON, and gradually increase Max-
Order from the first order. BuildHON+ was able to find up to 11th
order within 2 minutes, with a peak memory usage less than 5GB,
as the reference lines displayed in Fig. 8. In comparison, BuildHON
already exceeds the running time and memory consumption of
BuildHON+ at 6th order, reaches the physical memory limit (16GB)
of a high-end laptop at 8th order, and would need about 22 GB
memory and 6 minutes (3x time and 5x memory than BuildHON+)
to achieve the same results as BuildHON+ can.
5 DISCUSSION
This paper presents a higher-order network (HON) approach for
anomaly detection, which is capable of detecting higher-order
anomalies in sequences. In this work, we focused on two key ele-
ments: efficiency, and accuracy. In terms of accuracy, we show that
higher-order anomalies can remain completely undetected using
all existing anomaly detection methods that rely on the first-order
network (FON). On the efficiency side, we show that despite the ad-
vantages of HON, our existing HON construction algorithm is not
suitable for anomaly detection due to the extra parameters and poor
scalability for big data. We introduce BuildHON+, a parameter-free
algorithm that constructs HON from big data sets.
We show with a large-scale synthetic web clickstream data how
multiple existing anomaly detection methods that depend on FON
fail to capture higher-order anomalous navigation behaviors; we
further show how HON can be plugged in to existing methods
to enable the detection of various orders of anomalies. We also
demonstrate HON on a real-world taxi trajectory data, showing
its ability in amplifying higher-order anomaly signals and locating
anomalies. Finally, we provide complexity analysis of BuildHON+,
as well as running time and memory consumption benchmarking
results, which demonstrates how one can improve existing anomaly
detection approaches using BuildHON+ on large data sets with a
small overhead.
There are multiple directions for future improvements. First, the
proposed method generalizes beyond the web to the physical world.
With soccer ball-passing data, our method may be used to detect
the changes in strategies. With signature data, our method may
also serve as an indicator of fraud detection. For terrorist activities
or network hacking records, our method can help identify attacks
and higher-order anomalies. Second, while we showed various
graph distance metrics, one direction is to apply structure-based
metrics [2] that factor in changes of clustering or ranking results
and local properties such as motifs on the network – all of these
are directly compatible with BuildHON+. Finally, it would be of
practical importance to integrate higher order anomaly tetection
into visualization frameworks such as HoNVis [23].
REFERENCES
[1] Leman Akoglu, Mary McGlohon, and Christos Faloutsos. 2010. Oddball: Spotting
anomalies in weighted graphs. Advances in Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining
(2010), 410–421.
[2] Leman Akoglu, Hanghang Tong, and Danai Koutra. 2015. Graph based anomaly
detection and description: a survey. Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery 29, 3
(2015), 626–688.
[3] Varun Chandola, Arindam Banerjee, and Vipin Kumar. 2012. Anomaly detection
for discrete sequences: A survey. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data
Engineering 24, 5 (2012), 823–839.
[4] Varun Chandola, Varun Mithal, and Vipin Kumar. 2008. Comparative evaluation
of anomaly detection techniques for sequence data. In Eighth IEEE International
Conference on Data Mining. IEEE, 743–748.
[5] Eamonn Keogh, Jessica Lin, and Ada Fu. 2005. Hot sax: Efficiently finding the
most unusual time series subsequence. In Fifth IEEE International Conference on
Data mining. IEEE, 8–pp.
[6] Eamonn Keogh, Jessica Lin, Sang-Hee Lee, and Helga Van Herle. 2007. Finding the
most unusual time series subsequence: algorithms and applications. Knowledge
and Information Systems 11, 1 (2007), 1–27.
[7] Eamonn Keogh, Stefano Lonardi, and Chotirat Ann Ratanamahatana. 2004. To-
wards parameter-free data mining. In Proceedings of the tenth ACM SIGKDD
international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining. ACM, 206–215.
[8] M Kraetzl and WD Wallis. 2006. Modality distance between graphs. Utilitas
Mathematica 69 (2006), 97–102.
[9] Solomon Kullback and Richard A Leibler. 1951. On information and sufficiency.
The annals of mathematical statistics 22, 1 (1951), 79–86.
[10] Terran Lane. 1999. Hidden markov models for human/computer interface model-
ing. In Proceedings of the IJCAI-99 Workshop on Learning about Users. Citeseer,
35–44.
[11] Christoph C Michael and Anup Ghosh. 2000. Two state-based approaches to
program-based anomaly detection. In Computer Security Applications, 2000. AC-
SAC’00. 16th Annual Conference. IEEE, 21–30.
[12] Misael Mongiovi, Petko Bogdanov, Razvan Ranca, Evangelos E Papalexakis, Chris-
tos Faloutsos, and Ambuj K Singh. 2013. NetSpot: Spotting significant anomalous
regions on dynamic networks. In Proceedings of the 2013 SIAM International
Conference on Data Mining. SIAM, 28–36.
[13] Leto Peel and Aaron Clauset. 2015. Detecting Change Points in the Large-Scale
Structure of Evolving Networks.. In AAAI. 2914–2920.
[14] Brandon Pincombe. 2005. Anomaly detection in time series of graphs using arma
processes. Asor Bulletin 24, 4 (2005), 2.
[15] Arvind Ramanathan, Pratul K Agarwal, Maria Kurnikova, and Christopher J
Langmead. 2010. An online approach for mining collective behaviors from
molecular dynamics simulations. Journal of Computational Biology 17, 3 (2010),
309–324.
[16] Stephen Ranshous, Shitian Shen, Danai Koutra, Steve Harenberg, Christos Falout-
sos, and Nagiza F Samatova. 2015. Anomaly detection in dynamic networks:
a survey. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Computational Statistics 7, 3 (2015),
223–247.
[17] Dana Ron, Yoram Singer, and Naftali Tishby. 1994. Learning probabilistic au-
tomata with variable memory length. In Proceedings of the seventh annual confer-
ence on Computational learning theory. ACM, 35–46.
[18] Martin Rosvall, Alcides V Esquivel, Andrea Lancichinetti, Jevin D West, and
Renaud Lambiotte. 2014. Memory in network flows and its effects on spreading
dynamics and community detection. Nature communications 5 (2014).
[19] Venkatesh Saligrama and Zhu Chen. 2012. Video anomaly detection based on
local statistical aggregates. In IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition (CVPR). IEEE, 2112–2119.
[20] Peter Shoubridge, Miro Kraetzl, WALWallis, and Horst Bunke. 2002. Detection of
abnormal change in a time series of graphs. Journal of Interconnection Networks
3, 01n02 (2002), 85–101.
[21] Robert R Sokal. 1958. A statistical method for evaluating systematic relationships.
Univ Kans Sci Bull 38 (1958), 1409–1438.
[22] Pei Sun, Sanjay Chawla, and Bavani Arunasalam. 2006. Mining for outliers in
sequential databases. In Proceedings of the 2006 SIAM International Conference on
Data Mining. SIAM, 94–105.
[23] Jun Tao, Jian Xu, Chaoli Wang, and Nitesh V Chawla. 2017. HoNVis: Visualizing
and Exploring Higher-Order Networks. IEEE PacificVis (2017).
[24] Christina Warrender, Stephanie Forrest, and Barak Pearlmutter. 1999. Detecting
intrusions using system calls: Alternative data models. In Proceedings of the 1999
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE, 133–145.
[25] Jian Xu, Thanuka L Wickramarathne, and Nitesh V Chawla. 2016. Representing
higher-order dependencies in networks. Science advances 2, 5 (2016), e1600028.
[26] Jian Xu, Thanuka L Wickramarathne, Nitesh V Chawla, Erin K Grey, Karsten
Steinhaeuser, Reuben P Keller, John M Drake, and David M Lodge. 2014. Improv-
ing management of aquatic invasions by integrating shipping network, ecological,
and environmental data. In Proceedings of the 20th ACM SIGKDD international
conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining. ACM, 1699–1708.
9
